Audiobook

Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda

Year of Publication: 2011Genres: Business & Economics

Running Time: 32 hours 52 minutes 55 seconds

#	Chapter Name
1	Preface Joanne Turner	8:03
2	Conclusions of the Commission Joanne Turner	38:05
3	Conclusions of the Commission, concluded Joanne Turner	22:59
4	Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1 Joanne Turner	38:26
5	Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2 Joanne Turner	45:54
6	Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3 Joanne Turner	17:57
7	Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos Joanne Turner	30:09
8	Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis Joanne Turner	18:16
9	Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Joanne Turner	20:26
10	Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance Joanne Turner	12:11
11	Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives Joanne Turner	25:53
12	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities Joanne Turner	19:24
13	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management Joanne Turner	12:00
14	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash Joanne Turner	12:11
15	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance Joanne Turner	13:26
16	Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth Joanne Turner	8:47
17	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization Joanne Turner	17:04
18	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending Joanne Turner	6:19
19	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil Joanne Turner	5:33
20	Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators Joanne Turner	19:20
21	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force Joanne Turner	19:39
22	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium Joanne Turner	18:12
23	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny Joanne Turner	4:42
24	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending Joanne Turner	12:52
25	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position Joanne Turner	4:02
26	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention" Joanne Turner	10:44
27	Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage" Joanne Turner	5:45
28	Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6 Joanne Turner	1:18
29	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity Joanne Turner	10:21
30	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan Joanne Turner	32:56
31	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit Joanne Turner	6:49
32	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product Joanne Turner	17:23
33	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check Joanne Turner	16:09
34	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace Joanne Turner	13:09
35	Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7 Joanne Turner	3:24
36	Ch. 8. The CDO Machine Joanne Turner	7:50
37	Ch. 8. We Created the Investor Joanne Turner	22:21
38	Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function Joanne Turner	10:33
39	Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest Joanne Turner	10:51
40	Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street Joanne Turner	10:28
41	Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime Joanne Turner	17:16
42	Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy Joanne Turner	18:33
43	Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess Joanne Turner	19:27
44	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8 Joanne Turner	2:55
45	Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom" Joanne Turner	15:00
46	Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments Joanne Turner	22:31
47	Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory Joanne Turner	24:27
48	Regulators: markets will always self-correct Joanne Turner	14:56
49	Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance Joanne Turner	11:08
50	Lehman: From Moving to Storage Joanne Turner	7:47
51	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices Joanne Turner	11:36
52	2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool Joanne Turner	12:30
53	Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals Joanne Turner	17:05
54	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9 Joanne Turner	1:39
55	Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager" Joanne Turner	9:52
56	Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question" Joanne Turner	24:17
57	Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless" Joanne Turner	18:04
58	AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks" Joanne Turner	8:42
59	Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes" Joanne Turner	12:28
60	Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?" Joanne Turner	7:29
61	Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue" Joanne Turner	23:34
62	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10 Joanne Turner	2:20
63	Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market" Joanne Turner	29:56
64	Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before" Joanne Turner	8:04
65	Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending" Joanne Turner	4:50
66	Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information" Joanne Turner	10:10
67	Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?" Joanne Turner	13:22
68	Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11 Joanne Turner	2:33
69	Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries Joanne Turner	7:02
70	Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive Joanne Turner	13:59
71	Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds Joanne Turner	16:01
72	Rating Agencies Joanne Turner	4:27
73	AIG: Well Bigger Joanne Turner	7:39
74	Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12 Joanne Turner	0:56
75	Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro Cbteddy	2:06
76	Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors" Cbteddy	5:42
77	Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11" Cbteddy	8:29
78	Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells" Cbteddy	4:40
79	Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm" Cbteddy	4:04
80	Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose" Cbteddy	6:19
81	Commission conclusions on Chapter 13 Cbteddy	1:39
82	Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro) mpinedag	2:42
83	Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer" mpinedag	11:50
84	Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention" mpinedag	22:26
85	Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses" mpinedag	32:30
86	Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working" mpinedag	7:47
87	Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses" mpinedag	9:16
88	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14 mpinedag	1:15
89	Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro) Cbteddy	3:48
90	Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance" Cbteddy	4:06
91	Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical" Cbteddy	3:56
92	Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral" Cbteddy	9:15
93	Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors" Cbteddy	11:06
94	Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number" Cbteddy	4:42
95	Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole" Cbteddy	2:49
96	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15 Cbteddy	1:16
97	Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro) mpinedag	2:38
98	Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared" mpinedag	8:36
99	Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable" mpinedag	5:16
100	Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position" mpinedag	7:39
101	Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk" mpinedag	7:12
102	Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey" mpinedag	26:35
103	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16 mpinedag	1:19
104	Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro) Cbteddy	3:28
105	Ch 17 "A good time to buy" Cbteddy	5:04
106	Ch 17 "The only game in town" Cbteddy	3:30
107	Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool" Cbteddy	6:38
108	Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse" Cbteddy	3:58
109	Ch 17 "It will increase confidence" Cbteddy	8:45
110	Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices" Cbteddy	6:22
111	Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between" Cbteddy	7:31
112	Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution" Cbteddy	3:37
113	Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade" Cbteddy	1:16
114	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17 Cbteddy	2:26
115	Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro) mpinedag	4:37
116	Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded" mpinedag	7:17
117	Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all" mpinedag	3:38
118	Ch 18 "Spook the market" mpinedag	11:07
119	Ch 18 "Imagination hat" mpinedag	8:19
120	Ch 18 "Heads of family" mpinedag	3:38
121	Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind" mpinedag	3:20
122	Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty" mpinedag	8:02
123	Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail" mpinedag	3:48
124	Ch 18 "A calamity" mpinedag	12:42
125	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18 mpinedag	2:30
126	Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro) Cbteddy	5:14
127	Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious" Cbteddy	6:56
128	Ch 19 "Spillover effect" Cbteddy	10:50
129	Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant" Cbteddy	5:18
130	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19 Cbteddy	3:07
131	Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro) mpinedag	7:45
132	Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones" mpinedag	10:36
133	Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line" mpinedag	13:07
134	Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt" mpinedag	6:26
135	Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours" mpinedag	4:16
136	Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell" mpinedag	18:26
137	Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach" mpinedag	18:03
138	Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient" mpinedag	10:19
139	Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman" mpinedag	11:15
140	Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding" mpinedag	13:17
141	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20 mpinedag	2:45
142	Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro) Cbteddy	4:17
143	Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping" Cbteddy	12:15
144	Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts" Cbteddy	9:54
145	Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving" Cbteddy	5:09
146	Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls" Cbteddy	8:06
147	Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier" Cbteddy	3:18
148	Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery" mpinedag	6:39
149	Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard" mpinedag	6:37
150	Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios" mpinedag	5:39
151	Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving" mpinedag	5:26
152	Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22 mpinedag	1:01
153	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro Cbteddy	1:19
154	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others? Cbteddy	7:09
155	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis Cbteddy	2:26
156	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis Cbteddy	6:10
157	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy Cbteddy	8:30
158	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble Cbteddy	8:35
159	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets Cbteddy	7:28
160	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed Cbteddy	9:32
161	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure Cbteddy	13:52
162	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic Cbteddy	6:39
163	Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing Cbteddy	3:50
164	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro mpinedag	23:30
165	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary mpinedag	7:41
166	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages mpinedag	15:59
167	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects mpinedag	13:03
168	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages mpinedag	4:20
169	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS mpinedag	7:58
170	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis? mpinedag	17:17
171	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion mpinedag	4:40
172	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro Cbteddy	3:26
173	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system Cbteddy	3:21
174	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin Cbteddy	34:12
175	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro Cbteddy	9:00
176	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role Cbteddy	7:34
177	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards Cbteddy	35:58
178	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1 mpinedag	27:41
179	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2 mpinedag	28:32
180	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages mpinedag	10:15
181	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing mpinedag	5:10
182	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act mpinedag	22:13
183	Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion mpinedag	2:37